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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 Misperception clouds good decision-making in international politics. American 
foreign policy doesn’t currently allow for ample strategic communication training for the 
President of the United States to prevent misperception from becoming an issue in 
international relations. Looking at influential political theorists, it’s easy to discover that 
they all warn of the detriment that comes with an ineffective communicator in the highest 
power position in the country. 
 My research provides an overview of different perceptions formed by the United 
States and China of each other throughout the Presidency of Donald Trump and his 
counterpart in Beijing, President Xi Jinping. By analyzing the official press releases of 
each country about the foreign policy moves of the other, I was able to discover the 
points of weak policy where relations plummeted and where ‘sunshine politics’ prevailed, 
allowing for further development in the relationship between the two countries’ leaders. 
 When the two leaders were sticking to their agreement of having frequent 
meetings involving dialogue that both countries held in high precedent, perceptions were 
positive and relations were amicable. The opposite happened when the dialogue was 
infrequent and American Message-Influence foreign policy prevailed (Corman, 2008) 
where there was increased unilateral action towards China without dialogue. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The United States has a communication problem. 
As the country is struggling to hold its stance as the global hegemon, American 
spokespeople are distancing themselves, and the whole country, from the world (Corman 
and Trethewey, A New Communication Model For The 21st Century, 156)1. Without a 
communication strategy that focuses on global cooperation, diplomacy will be unreliable 
in promoting the country’s international image as the protector of democracy and 
freedom. 
 Recent cases of ill-communicated intentions have led America to propagate 
conflict in numerous ways. Our allies in Europe have become more unwilling to defer to 
American leadership and have actively distanced themselves from the U.S. sphere of 
influence. President Trump’s attendance last May for the 2017 NATO Summit and his 
refusal to reaffirm NATO’s famous Article 5, the guarantee of mutual defense, left 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel pessimistic about U.S. leadership. She announced in 
an impromptu press conference afterwards that, “The times in which we could 
completely depend on others are on the way out… We Europeans truly have to take our 
                                                 
1 This thought came from the text Stephen Corman and Angela Trethewey’s essay, A New Communication 
Model For The 21st Century, (Peter Lang Publishing, 2008) where they describe that the current American 
international communication strategy could be based off of their theory of the Message-Influence Model 
that describes the United States’ spokespeople as communicating ideas to foreign nations without properly 
conveying the intended meaning, so both sides grow in conflict because their perceptions differ so greatly 
from their dialogue. I don’t agree with the label it throws over all American diplomatic communication, but 
the focus on the “meaning-making” process prompted my research into the ways our dialogue is 
inefficiently conducted. 
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fate into our own hands.” (Frum, The Atlantic, May 2017). This was a decisive landmark 
indicator of leadership decline. 
 More conflicts continue unresolved with little diplomatic effort left in the United 
States to repair broken relations constructively. Afghanistan has been the longest standing 
war in American history, encouraged by the foreign policy spokespeople2 of both sides of 
the aisle to continue the war (Joyner, The Atlantic, May 2011). This interventionist 
foreign policy has persisted since the Cold War ended and has helped the United States 
keep to its guns to solve the War on Terror. 
 While still handling the old war, the president and his foreign policy actions have 
been flirting with revisiting conflict in North Korea. Denouncing previous 
administrations’ efforts, the current administration has demanded crushing sanctions be 
implemented by U.N. Security Council members on North Korea (Lynch and De Luce, 
Foreign Policy, April 2017). This continues even after Secretary Tillerson’s sacking. This 
has been supplemented by belittling language between the two countries’ leaders without 
any productive attempts at peace building or understanding. All of these foreign policy 
methods are counterintuitive to the international position of peace we advertise 
(Whitehead, 6).  
 The United States has a communication problem and the public is interested in 
knowing why. Since the United States played its crucial role in ending World War II, it’s 
enjoyed being a unilateral actor in international politics, and even more so after the Cold 
                                                 
2 James Joyner, founder and editor-in-chief of the weblog Outside The Beltway, denominates the two 
political groups who’ve become most prominent in U.S. foreign policy to create these destructive 
communication methods: neoconservatives and liberal interventionists. Neoconservatives as perpetuating 
war in order to spread American ideologies through permanent marks in left by the military. Liberal 
interventionists center around the Responsibility to Protect individuals abroad against their governments 
and military groups. Both have a readily available war option. 
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War. New trends of interstate relations have become decreasingly compromising and 
more dividing than ever before. In attempt to draw the hardline argument, American 
executive and ambassadorial representatives are sending messages to other countries of 
national prioritization. Allies and adversaries alike are being subject to the distancing 
that’s taking place, which declines hope for a more unified world.  
This strategy is a clear abandonment of the nation’s soft power that is gravely 
wounded. ‘Soft Power’, is a term coined by Joseph Nye in 1990, “which occurs when one 
country gets other countries to want what it wants… in contrast with the hard or 
command power of ordering others to do what it wants.” (Nye, Foreign Affairs, 2004).  
This is a delicate power. Having a cooperative relationship between two counties is a 
virtue of trust building and understanding, but it’s crucial to human existence. 
Our declining ‘Soft Power’ is the bottom line motivation to create institutional 
change in government. Non-governmental organizations and government liaison councils 
have been attempted and failed. In 2004, the Council on Foreign Relations recommended 
creating a "White House Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure," led by a 
presidentially appointed head, and a nonprofit "Corporation for Public Diplomacy" for 
the private sector to maintain outreach (Nye, Foreign Affairs, 2004). Neither of these 
suggestions were put into action. According to a Gallup poll done in January 2018 of 134 
countries, median percentage approval for U.S. leadership dropped to 30% from 48% in 
2016 (Ray, Gallup, 2018). Since the newly elected administration came into power, the 
ratings have continued sliding down to new lows in American confidence (Ray, Gallup, 
2018). 
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To find a trajectory that will restore American leadership confidence, the world 
and the United States must be able to express their own worldviews and listen to each 
other. This cooperation can best be achieved through utilizing a communication process 
that is already well-used in international affairs between high ranking individuals. 
Interpersonal Communication is a process that has no beginning or end, moving through 
different stages in competence of one’s own emotions and the emotions of the other 
participants in the conflict (Trenholm et Jensen, Interpersonal Communication, 5). The 
specific model of communication that I’m proposing in my research is the Model of 
Communication Competence designed by the leading academics in communication 
science, Sarah Trenholm and Arthur Jensen, for use by the president and the cabinet. 
They must be trained in this communication form to lead and represent the United States 
with awareness when communicating with leaders of other nations.  
Made clear by the lack of this strategic practice, the literature on the functions and 
benefits of this strategy is virtually non-existent. The idea that heads of state should 
follow a process that allows all parties to be legitimized in negotiation is a threat to the 
identities of participants, and thus a non-starter in its consideration as a viable practice3. 
In multiple studies by the Harvard International Negotiation Program, the identity 
                                                 
3 This comes from the ‘Tribes Effect’ that was outlined in Negotiating the Nonnegotiable: How to Resolve 
Your Most Emotionally Charged Conflicts by founder and director of the Harvard International Negotiation 
Program, Daniel Shapiro. The ‘Tribes Effect’ outlined the main levels for conflict resolution to be 
rationality, emotions, and identity. Primarily and on the surface level, people try to resolve conflicts 
rationally to maximize mutual gains. But if this fails, each level poses new more difficult challenges to 
resolve. Emotions cloud judgement and rationality, but with proper emotional awareness can tell you when 
a situation is working in your favor or something ethereal is obstructing further progress. Finally, the issue 
of identity is the most difficult to reconcile. This behavior model is crucial to understand in the realm of 
this thesis because it’s something virtually unchangeable in the human consciousness. It deals with the 
principle of human need to find meaning in their existence, which involves devotion to religious, cultural 
and ethical value systems that supersede all other variables in their lives. 
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becomes the indicator of who you are and most defended aspect of yourself (Shapiro, 
Negotiating the Nonnegotiable, pp. 7-10). This is exactly what Trenholm and Jensen 
address with the Model of Communication Competence and its intention to unlock 
identity to create transparency between all negotiation parties and minimize all forms of 
misperception. Chapter Two will focus on the theoretical explanation of this model and 
its applicability in foreign policy.  
The Foreign Service and the Department of State are tasked with managing and 
creating foreign policy decisions for the president and the executive offices (Childs, 
American Foreign Service, 36). Developed interpersonal communication skills is already 
a prerequisite for working in the State Department. Extending this necessary skill set to 
executive positions is a natural next step to improve international competence. In Chapter 
Three, the case will be made to exemplify the successes associated with foreign policy 
practiced through the State Department’s use of interpersonal communication and that the 
way the method taught to diplomats and foreign service officers is an exemplary way of 
training good dialogue practiced to the president and members of the cabinet.  
Chapter Four is where the prominent research of my thesis is tested. To support 
my claim for executive interpersonal relations training, I’ve outlined a crucial case in 
international politics with an outcome that is greatly dependent on negotiation. America’s 
relations with China have been on the forefront of many political analysts’ research and 
the advice from experts on what policies to adopt is continuously mixed. My research is 
analyzing the communication styles of the United States and of China by dissecting the 
press releases about each other and determining which tactics foster the friendliest 
bilateral relations. I will be analyzing the agreements, disagreements and tone of the press 
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releases from the executive offices of the United States and China during the presidential 
term of Donald Trump. My methodology assigns a number to each press release using the 
5-point Likert Scale based on the number of new agreements, revisited agreements, 
revisited disagreements, and new disagreements that determine the successes of ideas 
that’ve been communicated between the two negotiating parties to come to a consensus. 
The grading scale and details on the rubric used are explained further later in this chapter. 
Then in Chapter Five, I will discuss how an ideal function of international 
negotiation will become like how Truth and Reconciliation Commissions operate to 
dissolve conflict and lay ground work of non-violence. Using the successful example of 
the first commission established in post-apartheid South Africa, the benefits of choosing 
“peace over justice” are historically proven to unite two sides of a deeply dividing 
conflict such as national racial relations (Hayner, International Review of the Red Cross, 
2006). This example will provide context to my claim of promoting interpersonal 
communication in international politics and frame the way the United States can better its 
foreign policy in order to propagate world peace. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
THEORY 
 
 
 
 The topic of effective methods of negotiation is pertinent because of the amazing 
need for understanding communications in a politically, socially, and culturally 
globalized world. These types of dialogue are used to solve the world’s toughest 
problems in territory negotiations, peace talks, climate change discussion, and all 
internationally pertinent issues that require collaboration between nations. Research in 
this field is deeply important to the security of the United States, and how heads of state 
can be prepared to handle contentious issues. I evaluate the most effective 
communication strategies for maintaining and promoting peace to implement in high-
pressure international, political and diplomatic negotiation between representatives of the 
United States and leaders that represent foreign nations. In this chapter, I will focus on 
the crucial theoretical origins of international relations theory in accordance with 
advanced realist thinking. Then with an analysis of the existing communication 
methodology literature, an explanation of the theoretical arguments behind the 
communication methods being used contemporarily in liberal international relations 
theory. Finally, the theoretical framework of the communication model I believed to be 
the most effective and universally beneficial communication method in my preliminary 
research. 
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Misperception: The Bread and Butter Of Conflict 
 The realist school of thought in international relations is based on an anarchic 
international system. There is only so much that can be done to regulate the fighting 
between nations and whether or not they can attain peace after they’ve engaged in 
conflict. Central to these conflicts, why they start and why they end, is the perception and 
trust the two nations have with each other. When misperceptions seem more factual than 
speculative, a dangerous transformation occurs and the two countries become more 
unwilling to hear from the other side of the conflict. These notions are built into widely 
accepted realist international relations theory to explain the rationality of why nations 
choose war. This section outlines great realist theory that try to explain why 
misperception exists and the destruction it can cause if it goes unsolved. Waltz, 
Meirshiemer, Copeland, Morganthau, and Allison and Thucydides are the primary 
theorists that I will be using to discuss how misperception is central to realist 
international relations theory. 
 Kenneth Waltz is the preeminent scholar of the post-war era in international 
relations theory and has influenced numerous politicians and other theorists (Walt, 
“Kenneth N. Waltz, 1924-2013”, Foreign Policy, 2013). His career was kicked off by his 
published book, Man, the State and War in 1959 when he outlined one of his most important 
theoretical analyses of his time. Waltz proposed that there are three lenses, or ‘images’ of 
theoretical analysis when it comes to why conflict and war occurs, each more effective than the 
last.  
 The first image is ‘Man’, or the individual, that has huge consequence on the 
political sway of a nation-state. The charisma, decisiveness and common sense a person 
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has is defining for how the leadership role will be carried out. Conflict that is coaxed by 
individuals can be because of the nature of political leaders. He exemplifies Hitler and 
Napoleon in this part, and their psychology being relative to the time period of angst, 
need for dominance and a superiority complex4.  
 The second image is ‘State’, which is usually a nation-state made of people with 
common history, culture and/or language, and a presiding government. States have 
movements and surges of nationalism dependent on other nations around it, driving 
competition and bolstering rhetoric of, again, superiority. Waltz argues that colonialism 
was a state’s need to expand its enterprises and spread culture to the weak. 
 The third and inarguably most important image was the International System. He 
claimed that this is the originator of war, and that because the international system is 
anarchical, there’s nothing to prevent war from happening. Thus this permits all other 
theories of war to be permissible. Nothing can stop war other than the realization that war 
isn’t what the people want. What perpetuates the necessity to be prepared for a war is its 
uncertainty. The possibility exists as long as there is distrust in the other state, which can 
lead to something as dangerous as a security dilemma (Herz, Political Realism and 
Political Idealism: a Study in Theories and Realities, 1951). The security dilemma is an 
important aspect in exemplifying misperception in international relations, also described 
by Herz as the Spiral Model, is defined as the distrustful relations countries form by 
increasing military strength to make the other country increase its military strength. This 
                                                 
4 The main body of my research stems from the first image being a key element in how other nations 
perceive the United States. Representing the will of the United States is the primary job of the president of 
each country. Xi Jinping and Donald Trump make invaluable impressions for the people of the other 
country about the one they represent, and it’s because of the platform they’re given as described by 
Kenneth Waltz’s theory. 
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causes tension between the two countries to grow and reason for reconciliation to worsen 
to the point where they have no trust left between them. This creates a void where trust 
once belonged, but now conflict can grow and possibly lead to war. 
 Another great theorist in realist international relations is John Meirsheimer who 
originated ‘Offensive Realism’, founding that states look to gain power over others at the 
expense of other states (Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001). He 
delineates that states can never be certain about other states' intentions, which causes 
misperceptions, and leads to rising conflicts. He also describes how the United States has 
become a vessel for textbook liberal foreign policy because of the optimistic worldview 
we claim and how we use it to motivate our government and non-state actors to help 
improve national welfare and the world’s. 
 Another influential voice in realist political thought that contributes to the 
definition of misperception is Dale Copeland, author of The Origins of Major War, and 
strong proponent of the Balance of Power Theory. He says great powers that anticipate 
deep and inevitable decline are more likely to initiate wars or hard-line policies that 
substantially increase the risk of major war through inadvertent escalation (Copeland, The 
Origins of Major War, 2000). This sentiment of inevitability that he describes is 
attributed to feeling helpless in maintaining peace because it’s seemingly impossible to 
avoid viewing the other side as a threat when observing them prepare for conflict. It’s as 
if peering you’re out a train car window to see the train heading towards a track block 
and the train isn’t slowing down to not crash into it. 
 Hans Morganthau is a classical realist whose realist theories took hold in the early 
20th century (Morganthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, 1946). He’s most notable 
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for believing that conflict is based in human nature, and countries’ reactions to events or 
uneven powers dynamics is to assert their dominance or stand their ground in the face of 
conflict for their own survival. This school of thought is the purest realist creed in 
international relations, and calls for the observation of certain objectivity in human 
nature. He explains best in his quote from Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace: 
Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is 
governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In 
order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by 
which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to 
our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure. 
(Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, 1978, pg. 4) 
 
 In his book, he takes this notion of objective laws rooted in human nature and 
expands it to include survivalism in the context of observing when other nations are 
preparing for military conflict without explanation. He argues that misperception is very 
likely to happen in international politics because human nature prompts us to jump to 
conclusions of high cost for the sake of survival. Whether or not action is taken by the 
nation is influenced heavily by the head of state, even in the highest-functioning 
democracies.  
 Lastly, of the most notable realist international relations theorists who speak about 
misperception and its effects, Graham Allison and Thucydides, two prolific academics 
separated by thousands of years of international diplomatic and war history agree on a 
very particular theory. Coined as the Thucydides Trap, the ancient Greek historian told 
his History of the Peloponnesian War and described how Athens was a rising power in a 
Spartan-dominated region where their powers were beginning to conflict and the Sparta 
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saw Athens’ potential to overtake the rank of regional hegemon (Thucydides, History of 
the Peloponnesian War, 1910). It was this advanced anxiety about being overtaken by the 
new might of Athens that allowed Sparta to believe that engaging in war has become 
seemingly inevitable.  
Allison takes this theory and sees its applicability in a variety of cases throughout history. 
He builds a database of highly charged conflicts when a rising power threatened the 
established power who declares war to prevent its own decline and because of the 
security dilemma, as referenced previously by Herz and Waltz (Allison, Destined For 
War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides’s Trap?, 2017). He discusses this 
scenario in the case study of China, being a riding power, and the United States, being 
challenged as an established power. His data of China’s rise is irrefutable, claiming that 
the United States has been left behind in purchasing power parity (PPP), number of active 
duty military, and although many of Allison’s descriptions and assumptions of China 
have been claimed to be exaggerated, professional economists and foreign policy wonks 
are at least weary about the data projections (Buruma, Ian, “Are China and the United 
States Headed for War?”, The New Yorker, 2017). Allison describes the nervous 
reasoning that many tense relations where the United States is predicted to be 
economically eclipsed by China in the next two decades, many countries have succumbed 
to the Thucydides’ Trap under less grave circumstances. It’s believed that the cost of war 
would be too high to enter a great power conflict at this point in military technological 
development (Buruma, 2017). As tensions in East Asian politics, economic competition, 
and proxy conflicts continue rising, he warns that small frictions have the potential to 
amplify under high-pressure context and become explosive.  
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Misperception is one of the most dangerous symptoms of pre-war conditions that 
realist international theorists describe and nearly all of them warn of this reality. Realists 
claim that to defend against misperception and the cause of war, transparency is 
necessary to build trust between nations. Although the realist agenda doesn’t prescribe 
supranational organizations to manage interstate affairs to dilute conflict potential, they 
do promote bilateral trust building, which calls for both nations understanding each 
other’s perspectives. 
Liberal and Contemporary Theory Reacts 
 Realist international relations theory has roots in human nature being the 
foundation for all international decisions made by a country, and which allows for 
misperception to take place. Liberal international relations decree that there’s more at 
work than just human nature, and that to maintain peace, freedom and human rights 
promotes this cooperation between nations. Alexis de Tocqueville, Thomas Paine, 
Immanuel Kant in the 1700s and more recent theorists like Andrew Moravcsik and 
Francis Fukuyama advocate that there are major variables within the international system 
that help support peace and that help deteriorate it that go beyond human nature. 
Misperception isn’t delineated as a core variable by liberal theorists, but that there must 
be transparency in the behavior of nations to maintain peace. 
 Moravesik attributes liberal international relations theory as being a “bottom-up” 
approach to how relationships between countries are formed (Moravcsik, “Taking 
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, International 
Organization, 1997). The two assumptions within liberalism that define the school of 
thought are that the core actors in international relations are the individuals and 
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prosperous groups that make intra-national relations possible, and second, that the 
political institutions that run every state represent a particular subset of the country it 
represents and not the whole will of the people (Moravcsik, 1997). These two basic 
assumptions fuel liberal concerns of how easily a head of state can undermine the 
positive development fostered by intra-national leaders and that they can do this without 
having full consent from their constituents. This leaves a wide berth for nations to 
misperceive each other’s intentions and the real will of the people, which most theorists 
agree is to remain alive and not at war. 
 The other notable liberal international relations theorist who is crucial to this 
literature analysis of misperception is Francis Fukuyama who professed that liberalism 
has become the global thought that allows other thoughts to exist but not prevail over it 
(Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest, 1989). It’s owed to “Common 
Marketization” that has brought the whole world into the global market sphere and made 
trade the diplomacy that links everyone together, becoming the single most effective 
deterrent to war in the world. He warns readers in his article: 
 
Failure to understand that the roots of economic behavior lie in the 
realm of consciousness and culture leads to the common mistake of 
attributing material causes to phenomena that are essentially ideal in 
nature. (Fukuyama, 1989) 
 
Maintaining healthy economics already prevents the majority of risky political moves, 
but when economics and politics turn unhealthy between two countries, what happens to 
relations? What prevents them from sparking conflict? This question made me turn to 
modern communication strategies and theories to search further for an answer.  
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 Reviewing literature on the topic of international political communication means 
getting a broad and specific understanding of mistakes and theories of the negotiation 
process that could help expand our perspective of human interaction. We must observe an 
essential problem at the forefront of U.S. rhetoric that expresses distrust and instigates 
alienation towards foreigners (Hess, Aaron; Justus, H. S. Redefining The Long War: 
Toward a New Vocabulary of International Terrorism, 2008) in the words that are used 
by spokespeople and leaders of the American government. Aaron Hess proposes the 
assembly of a new list of vocabulary to be used by the U.S. government when speaking 
about issues like terrorism and especially the actions of our military against people who 
live in these origins of mass terror groups formed against the West. He makes one thing 
critical; that the U.S. must refer to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as what it is by 
definition: a global problem, not a problem of America against the world. This way, 
there’s less targeting of languages and regions, makes it easier and more profitable to 
determine success, reduces a ‘terrorist’ to just a criminal, and creates a broader 
partnership within the international community against smaller and unjust group of 
people.  
 Specifically, the authors propose that terrorists should be scrutinized under the 
international laws in place that incriminate them that have been decided on by a global 
judicial body such as the ICJ. This way, citizens sympathize with more multilateral 
efforts and organizations to fight in unity against injustice and no one wants to join a 
futile and desperate movement to destabilize a strong, united world. This exemplifies the 
importance of diction in constructive and wise communication as a function of peace and 
consensus. Political dialogue has necessary communication outlines of which, if not 
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adhered to, will deconstruct progress and set people further apart from understanding the 
other’s point of view. 
 Critically important to exploring available methodologies in international 
communication is analyzing those already used in the United States Department of State. 
Esteemed political science academics, Tretheway and Corman, described the 
department’s rhetoric and communication using the message-influence model, 
characterized as projecting agendas or manipulating circumstances in order to attain self-
oriented goals without a negotiation partner’s consent. The new communication method 
that they see would be more globally-minded is the pragmatic complexity model 
(Tretheway, Corman, A New Communication Model For The 21st Century, 2008), which 
is the agreement between participants to form an active resolution that the two sides must 
always feel is mutually beneficial, or the resolution must be renegotiated. 
 These two methods are excellent examples of methods already put in place in the 
international political landscape and that create a great base for my proposition, by 
adding interpersonal communication. The authors described the United States’ 
communication methods as a “nation to other nations” (Baxter, Braithwaite, Engaging 
Theories in Interpersonal Communication: Multiple Perspectives, 2008), saying that 
although the country is portrayed as a credible source and the most powerful single voice 
on the international stage, the country must work to down play its influences to a low-
credibility source.  We must regain legitimacy as a credible power by changing our short 
and long term communication strategies. 
 The goal is to cultivate constructive negotiation strategies that can be used across 
platforms in international relations. In Corman et al.’s work, Weapons of Mass 
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Persuasion: Strategic Communication to Combat Extremism, the authors reference the 
Message Influence Model as being the current method of communication for 
international negotiation for the U.S. government and the state department. The way the 
strategy works is that when an American official conveys a proposition or idea to 
someone representing a foreign entity, the message must demonstrate the power of the 
United States and encourages them to understand the concept through the American 
perspective. I agree with the authors’ sentiments that this is not beneficial for all 
participants in discussion. Though, what I disagree with the authors on is their solution, 
which was the Pragmatic Complexity Model, which illustrates joint gains being created 
in the course of a deal will need to be allocated between the parties of that deal. It’s 
centered around an agreement of “double contingency” that blocks a resolution 
completely if one part of it is not agreed upon by both/all parties, which could create 
endless gridlock. This is an example of what happens when the wrong communication 
forms have been used for so long to persuade and manipulate others to heed our wills. 
Avoiding these backtracks, it’s necessary to cast aside the ego of the vain “perceived 
self” and create an equal value with negotiating partners. 
 We do not assume that influence and coercion are absent from negotiation by 
definition, that parties always negotiate in good faith, or that negotiated agreements are 
all “win-win” relative to the status quo. Using interpersonal communication makes goals 
and favorable long term resolutions that yield better results when the negotiations are 
inclusive and egalitarian. An excellent account I found in my research of a successful use 
of this method was the Good Friday agreements negotiated by in Belfast, Northern 
Ireland between the British and the Irish about the Northern Irish territory (Wolff, “The 
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Road to Peace? The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland”, 
2001), which featured famously a long discussion between parliamentary members of 
each nation mediated by United States special envoys to create a consensual agreement to 
end terrorism in the region ad pacify the border region. 
 Another important article created a roadmap for a successful political dialogue by 
American scholar, Andries Odendaal, shows necessary pre-conditions, present climate, 
and post-resolution initiative for a lasting political consensus. He sets up the dialogue 
steps as prerequisites for “objective, reliable analysis of the conflict” (Odendaal, The Role 
of Political Dialogue in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011), first by telling the 
reader what to keep in mind throughout dialogue and to commit to “leadership and 
inclusion” of all parties. The steps to follow for good dialogue first begins with 
assembling pre-established groups to give input on the issue(s) being discussed, then 
finding the proper mediator/mediating body, and finally applying the strategies to 
interpersonal conflict resolution. 
 The scholar points out that this process laid out is also not rigid or authoritarian by 
having outlines and rules. This type of political dialogue is the situation universally 
beneficial ad applicable. Summit dialogue is used for high-tension negotiations of 
interstate involvement and two track dialogue is between individuals or non-state actors 
of concern to other nation states (Grarnham, Contribution to a Political Economy of 
Mass-Communication, 1979). The multi-level dialogue is what would be most 
exemplified in my working paper, because I want to include all levels of interstate 
dialogue and bring it to an individual-based interpersonal level when it comes to leaders 
debating amongst each other. 
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 To prove the applicability of my research findings, I read literary pieces on 
intergroup dialogue outside the direct context of international relations and security so 
see if there are aspects of civilian interactions that can be incorporated into improving 
standards of diplomatic communication. I read about an inter-university group dialogue 
organization formed in hopes of creating more tolerance and acceptance of all 
communities involved in the university system and its community. Although this isn’t 
directly in correlation with politics like the focus of my research, this is an excellent 
example of how I propose nations work with one another. The organization’s historical 
context has origins in schools across America creating inter-race and inter-faith groups in 
wake of the massive changes thrust forward during Brown vs. The Board of Education 
(1954). To diffuse tensions in educational and community environments, school boards 
organized dialogue groups to discuss ways to integrate and overcome grievances of the 
massive social change brought upon the nation by the Supreme Court decision. 
 What I researched explains that a lot of these groups founded in universities across 
the country now still combat many racial and faith related issues and the groups continue 
to serve this main function. The author interviewed several people unaffiliated with 
groups that say that there’s a feeling of woe associated with being inactive and unknown 
to the diversity of their own community (Gurin, et al. Intergroup Dialogue: Its Role in 
Contemporary Society, 2013). This is the primary cause of barriers, prejudices and 
xenophobic aggressions being formed in communities. I propose that this is very relatable 
to the need for international discussion groups not only among political leaders elected, 
but normal citizens from different countries. The details in the inter-community dialogue 
situation serve as a great microcosm example of how international dialogue through 
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group expression and familiarity will help people become more comfortable with one 
another. 
 Another important communication aspect I explored in the body literature available 
that has an effect on the outcome of international debate is the “Culture Industry” as a 
marker of communication marketing that is changing the face of mass communication 
and how governments express their ideas to their people and the world. The concept 
suggests that the materialistic nature of new communication platforms which once was 
the prevalence of television and radio, but it is now social media and smartphones 
technology. communicating politics is changing to disseminate new information faster 
and for more opinions to form more quickly. I would use this to create a platform for new 
communication that can improve government accountability and honesty and help aid 
relations with other nations, convincing the representatives to adopt a consensual 
approach to international negotiations that would help promote empathy and 
understanding. 
 Lastly and one of the most important areas of interest to think about in the context 
of international political communication is the importance of the people in keeping 
government communication transparent and reporting the truth to the common folk. 
Democracy calls for the freedom of speech to maintain honest and open negotiations, this 
author writes. He says that some selfishly campaigned politicians is that “the more they 
communicate, the more they are doubted. Hence, the trust which is a fundamental to the 
workings of a democratic system is constantly being undermined. I consider statistics and 
philosophical examples of government distrust as being a non-starter for honest dialogue 
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and communication, between the hierarchy of the international system as well as its own 
people. 
 My theoretical analysis includes primary definitions of three different 
communication types: the message-influence model, the pragmatic complexity model, 
and interpersonal communication. The message-influence model is described as operating 
like an old wire telephone, that the information source transmits information to the 
receiver in the exact way and vision of the information source, without consideration of 
the receiver or how the receiver’s perspective would interpret the information. The 
pragmatic complexity model is based on an A discussant and a B discussant, where A and 
B form a mutually-assured resolution agreement, but discussant A has more of the power 
and direct stake in the conflict. A’s behavior is dependent on external conflict conditions 
and B’s feelings and expressions, and B’s behavior is dependent almost completely on 
A’s feelings on the situation. Lastly, interpersonal communication is the strategy of 
projecting equality and consideration of all feelings and sentiments on the issue, 
considering the matter an issue that must have a mutually consensual resolution to 
succeed, independent of self-first oriented negotiation. 
 By the definition of Odell and Tingley, a political negotiation is successful when it 
meets two criteria: at a minimum, parties reach a mutual-gain deal (Odell et al. Political 
Negotiation, 2016) (one that would benefit the set of parties as a whole and many if not 
all of them individually) when such a deal is feasible, and that the negotiation reaches a 
deal that is more successful to the degree that it exhausts the potential for enhancing the 
parties’ utilities. 
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 I propose that the communication method of interpersonal communication is the 
best format and environment for all groups represented to discuss, listen, analyze, express 
and observe all opinions on an international matter. This is also the best way to succeed 
in resolving a conflict non-violently, because it allows participants in the discussion to 
envision the other side(s) in their fullest humanity and compassion. 
 My hypothesis is a serious declaration that involves extensive background research 
into the kinds of interpersonal communication that gives the accusation legitimacy. It’s 
centered around the notion of conflict transformation, which is designed for ethical 
peace-embedded justice centered around respect for human rights and life. Advocation 
for non-violence is a way of life and work to supplement conflict transformation in 
making human relationships bilateral and communicative. John Paul Lederachl, author of 
The Little Book of Conflict Transformation, explains that three lenses are necessary to see 
a situation fully in the moment to create the best solution to the issue (Lederach, The 
Little Book of Conflict Transformation., 2003). First is the immediate situation, second is 
the analyzation of the deeper relationship patterns creating the conflict, and third is the 
framework that holds all perspectives together contributing to the conflict. Conflict is a 
huge and natural part of human growth with each other and themselves. Mastering the 
empathy and compassion for others and then using that to promote growth in each other 
when there’s conflict makes a resolution that leaves all parties better off than when they 
came together in the first place.  
 It is important to both envision and respond to incur growth in conflict resolution. 
In international relations, diplomats negotiate in high stress situations often involving 
deeply hostile sides of an issue. To keep peace dynamic, adaptive, and changing in 
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resolution methods to find its most effective way, we must continue to analyze the 
structure and transform the methods based on the observations of how the last attempt 
went at resolving the international crises. Conflicts don’t get solved perfectly the first 
time or any other time for that matter. Conflict transformation, by definition, is 
relationship based, personal and experiential because it focuses on real core changes to 
resolve issues so the long term effect can stay relevant and helpful, as opposed to conflict 
resolution which is about relieving the pain of the current conflict through any possible 
method without acknowledgment of the future cases that could come into view (Gaber et 
al. Too Much of a Good Thing, 2007). 
 This aligns with the notion of progress being non-linear and that all normal parts of 
the retrogression & the expression change in a conflict. An epicenter or core issue of a 
conflict is a platform, which acts like a trampoline; very good to start from and jump into 
the transformation process. We have a capacity to envision & to present issues as a 
window that takes us beyond immediate situations by examining the situations in the long 
term and that the whole “mountain range” of issues provides a bigger picture that is 
imperative to compassion and maintaining the resolution attained. With this in mind, I’d 
like to propose that the method(s) that should be used in international negotiation should 
be respectful, considerate of all parties’ concerns, and able to apply to all people. 
 This project provides insight needed about an option in international conflict that is 
often easily forgotten: that continuously acknowledging the humanity in others is a 
realistic tactic that deserves more legitimacy that it receives. Interpersonal relations and 
communication methods involve a step by step process that it backed by contentions of 
non-violence. The kinds of negotiation that result in violence are the ones that promote 
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emotional ignorance, belligerent self-centeredness, and insensitivity to others’ points of 
view. How we move forward as a global society and a species is through the training of 
emotional literacy in our elected leaders. Through these methods, we can achieve this and 
incorporate it into the daily lives of all peoples. 
 
Interpersonal Communication Theory: Peace Through Equality 
Interpersonal Communication strategy has been developed to give all participants 
in the process a platform to hear, be heard, and understand the conflict from all sides. 
This theory has been developed and proven to effectively develop a working relationship 
between people where they can move towards a consensus in any conflict. Formatted by 
Dr. Sarah Trenholm and Dr. Arthur Jensen, the Model of Communicative Competence 
incorporates five core elements of being proficient in interpersonal communication 
(Trenholm and Jensen, Interpersonal Communication, 10). These focus points help 
combat prejudice and ethnocentric tendencies that are in human behavioral patterns, and 
that prevent productive problem-solving. Cross-cultural communication can be stifled 
easily by assumptions that prevent productive discussion of issues that affect everyone in 
the negotiations. Trenholm and Jensen have come up with the Model of Communicative 
Competence which maps the internal competence needed to become fluent in this form of 
communication.  
The model, although not meant originally for international negotiation, is meant to 
defuse tensions and bridge the gap for understanding between people from fundamentally 
different backgrounds. Its basic purpose would be very useful in communications 
between heads of state. Very often, as we’ve seen in the conclusions of acclaimed 
theorists of international relations, heads of state make judgements and claims based on 
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misperceptions caused by inaccurate or incomplete information which leads to conflict. 
This process guides participants through their internal levels of decision-making to bring 
them to the most informed conclusion to act upon. 
On the next page, Figure 2.1 shows the Model of Communicative Competence 
(Trenholm and Jensen, 10) mapped out to demonstrate the process one goes through to 
generate informed communication, both receiving and sending. These steps in the process 
are already parts of all communication and the point of this detailed outline is to improve 
ones’ self-awareness in new situations and receptiveness to new ideas in dialogue. The 
process begins in the model by receiving new information from an outside source and 
interpreting it. This involves analyzing the situation and people providing the 
information, understanding what the situation will potentially ask, and what is able to be 
provided. The information flows from the interpretation competence throughout the chart 
to address how the role, self, and goal competence interprets this information. Role 
competence is analyzing placement in the situation, what advice or information to give, 
and what behavior to exhibit in the environment to most accurately present ideas. Self-
competence is central to understanding self-image, which is critical to how others 
perceive one’s actions that are devastating to be misconstrued in negotiations. Goal 
competence is delineating what the desired results are from their participation in dialogue 
and becoming informed of the other participants’ goals as well. These three steps of the 
process flow next into message competence, which involves the process of coding 
internal decision-making and reactions into an outward form of communication. This step 
includes verbal (linguistic tools), nonverbal (body language) and relational competence 
(conveying desired relationship), that when communicated unmindfully, can cause 
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misperception in the receiver when the information used to react isn’t processed fully 
through the previous steps. After all of these steps, there is performative competence 
which is the step where the user expresses their messages to others with the backing of 
their communicative competence process (Trenholm and Jensen, 10).  
This methodology helps protect negotiations against becoming ill-informed and 
biased by gaining control over perceptions. Trenholm and Jensen refer to the Process of 
Perception when we are recognizing and appreciating complex internal competency and 
the individuality that must be taken into account (Trenholm and Jensen, 145). Their 
research has shown that emotions in addition to the ‘capacity to reason’ is what creates 
effective decisions (Trenholm and Jensen, 145). In the context of international 
negotiations between heads of state, this method combats the truths of the Sapir-Wharf 
Hypothesis, Expectancy Violations Theory, and rules of cooperative problem solving. 
 
Figure 2.1 
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 The Sapir-Wharf Hypothesis states that language determines that way we interpret 
the world through how we communicate ideas to one another. Otherwise known as 
Linguistic Relativity (Kay and Kempton, 1984), the hypothesis claims that speakers of 
different languages, and people from different cultures by extension, experience the 
world differently. Language and thought are permanently interlinked and definitions 
merge with thoughts until they become inseparable, as Nietzsche would agree5. The 
implicit knowledge each person has from their own cumulative experiences creates their 
perception of the world, and the model helps guide the analysis of this information.  
 Expectancy Violations Theory measures the perception of someone’s actions that 
one has of another person based on their prejudice of them (Trenholm and Jensen, 76). 
Whether the prejudice is positive or negative, this affects the perception of one’s actions 
and hinders their ability to be understood. The theory explains that people have different 
reactions between people who break the same rules or accomplish the same tasks based 
on their prejudice of them before the action. If dyads in interpersonal communication are 
crucial relationships that are the building blocks for lasting peace, then these aspects of 
the theory must be analyzed before decisions or communications are made to harm trust 
between people. 
Within formalized cooperative negotiation, there are guidelines to streamline 
these efforts. From the gathered literature, there seem to be five core rules for cooperation 
problem solving. First, diagnosing personal goals to makes intentions clear and easy to 
                                                 
5 Although he has little to do with international relations, Nietzsche has been accredited with core findings 
in inseparable bonds between language and thought and how in conjunction, they affect perception 
(Nietzsche, “On the Origin of Language (1869-70)”, 1989). How heads of state create misperceptions can 
also be traced back to his psychological findings within the framework of language and social norms that 
unconsciously define communication. 
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communicate. Second, making the effort to understand others’ interests and emotions will 
create trust and respect between all negotiators. Third, accepting that emotions can run 
high and are legitimate before formal negotiations begin. Fourth, focusing on interests 
instead of positions will direct attention away from identity issues that cannot be ‘solved’ 
or changed within the context of conflict negotiation, if ever. Lastly, if there are impasses 
in negotiations, to consider third party help to moderate and provide objective neutrality. 
These five rules provide clarity into issues by acknowledging biases that could prevent 
consensual problem solving.  
Heads of state are susceptible to these human biases like anyone else, which is 
basis of both interpersonal communication and international relations theory. The 
difference is that they are incumbents of immense power positions and their decisions are 
much more costly and effect many more people than whether or not a marriage ends or a 
student is expelled from school6. Heads of state are at the powerful focal point of where 
public and private communication meet, which means that all of their communications 
are being perceived and judged. They cannot escape the context that their jobs provide, 
but heads of state don’t receive training to prevent the formation of uninformed 
judgements. Strategic interaction can include directives/straight stalemates, persuasion, 
compliance, instrumental and relational communication, but all efforts will fail without 
trust between negotiators. Interpersonal relations humanizes conflict and enables dialogue 
on the pretense that all negotiators are equal in their humanity, a point which becomes 
lost in political context but is undeniable in everyone’s personal perception of conflict. 
                                                 
6 Interpersonal communication methods are used most notably in school systems, couples’ counseling, and 
domestic issues which is highlighted numerous times in Trenholm and Jensen’s works. 
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In the next chapter, I will address the current and historical efforts of the United 
States foreign policy to facilitate strategic communication and understand past president’s 
efforts to foster trusting relationships with other countries and their leadership. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
 
 American foreign policy has experienced many inconsistent phases over the past 70 
years since the end of World War II. The United States has had to satiate the world’s 
need for international leadership, as well as implement a “laissez-faire” relationship with 
the global community and foster their self-sustainability. In the American government’s 
attempt to satisfy both pleas, it adopted strategies of “maximalism” and “retrenchment” 
that succeeded in deepening American international involvement, expanding as an 
industrial powerhouse, and reassuring allies that global communism could never be 
realized. After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., regional adversaries sprouted from Cold War 
ashes in the Middle East and gave rise to the Global War on Terror. As the scope 
widened and unipolarity was the globally accepted American position, the strategies of 
maximalism and retrenchment continued to be toggled between. Although there has been 
discontinuity in foreign policy strategy between administrations, I would argue that the 
Trump administration has become an extreme anomaly in foreign policy change. The 
early actions and rhetoric we’ve observed from the current president demonstrates the 
significance of the next three to seven years he’ll hold office in reevaluating America’s 
alliances, international legislation, and the country’s image on the world stage as it takes 
a step back in liberal democratic leadership. This section will evaluate the successful and 
misdirected policies and actions of American foreign relations over the last 70 years, and 
why the president needs a formalized communication strategy. This paper will also 
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chronologically describe these events in the context of maximalist, retrenchment, and 
Trump’s current strategies that are unfolding. 
 Post-World War II era foreign policy is characterized by the success of nation-
building and democratization in fostering new alliances. The European reconstruction era 
was ultimately a win for the “maximalist” mentality for maintaining American 
dominance, after employing the Marshall Plan (or the European Recovery Program, 
ERP), NSC-68 and the Containment Doctrine. In the Truman Doctrine given in March 
1947, President Harry Truman said, “One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy 
of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be 
able to work out a way of life free of coercion,”(Truman, pg.3) and the new hopes for the 
future of Europe were realized. In this defense of international aid, Truman initiated the 
Marshall Plan’s full force and international aid to bring in Europe into line with the West. 
The United States initiated covert anti-communist aid and direct assistance to countries it 
thought could be swayed away from the Soviets without igniting direct war with them. 
The $4 billion congress gave Truman for the Marshall Plan in 1948 to rebuild its 
European allies (Ambrose pg.92) so they may rejoin the ranks against a new threat in 
Europe once they’ve regained hard-power and industrial abilities. In 1950, NSC-68 was 
put into immediate action after the Containment Doctrine was fully realized by the 
United States government on advice of the “Sources of Soviet Conduct”, by George 
Kennan.  In this analysis, he outlined in depth the formation of the Russian government 
since its official American recognition in 1933 and its hostile views and foreign policy 
goals towards the West and its capitalist agenda. The Containment Doctrine and NSC-68 
were paired in initiation to positively affect the other in symbiotic positive feedback to 
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convince third party countries to join the United States and other Western block states, 
but most importantly, to not join the communists in Russia and secondarily in China. This 
was demonstrating the active foreign policy the time called for in wake of Soviet 
aggressions in the Middle East and Eastern Europe as their sphere of influence grew with 
the Warsaw Pact and militaristic suppressions of insurrections within territorial influence. 
This is noted as a success in maximalist thinking and a bold beginning for the American 
legacy of advancing the strength our allies. 
 With the emergence of the Cold War came more weighted risk with major power 
engagement. Due to the prevalence of nuclear arms early in the conflict, the stakes rose 
quickly, causing rules of engagement to be informally set by 1949 when intelligence 
became informed of the U.S.S.R.’s first nuclear weapons test. The global dichotomy was 
solidified in the formation of nuclear weapons blocks as NATO was founded in 1949 and 
the Warsaw Pact in 1955 when both sides had acquired staggering nuclear arsenals. The 
country’s leadership in forming NATO was crucial to the Western bloc’s military and 
political unity throughout the Cold War. The maximalist support was waining by the end 
of Truman’s time in office when it became apparent that the nuclear arsenal growth in 
Russia wasn’t noticeably decreasing and the citizens were feeling the burn in heightened 
taxes going to support NATO and the UN that weren’t helping their cause. The 
retrenchment strategy was first implemented in the Eisenhower administration when he 
became president in 1953. Sestanovich said, “[Eisenhower] believed that Harry Truman’s 
approach to national security was neither successful nor sustainable,” and that his new 
administration was tasked with fixing his predecessor’s problems by having to “escape a 
military stalemate, cut the cost of defense, shift burdens to allies, replace stale ideological 
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rhetoric with more hopeful initiatives, and shore up domestic support.”(Sestanovich, 67) 
Retrenchment strategy was another successful American foreign policy, building stable 
foundations for more integrated international relations with allies in Western Europe and 
Asia as he sealed peace in Korea, and avoided nuclear escalation with the U.S.S.R. 
 Retrenchment won many non-interventionalist battles early in the conflict. In 1956, 
Eisenhower only diplomatically intervened in the seizure of the Suez Canal by Anglo-
French forces, stating that this is a terrible message to be sending out to prospective allies 
in the Third World and to stop their military campaign against Egypt immediately. But 
the maximalist strategy pulled ahead when preservation of the Containment Doctrine 
became necessary through military intervention. The Korean War was bitterly fought to 
end aggressive expansion of communism in the Korean peninsula from Chinese and 
Russian support of North Korea and their Leader Kim Il Sung. United Nations forces, led 
predominantly by the United States, entered the war in 1950 to prevent a domino from 
falling, and to provide relief to the invaded South Koreans. But in the change of the 
presidency, Eisenhower ended the conflict with a ceasefire at the 38th parallel. The 
Vietnam War, however, was one of the worst interventions in world history, where the 
U.S. always held and carried out a maximalist interventionist view from supporting 
French recolonization after the end of World War II and then the Diem regime of South 
Vietnam, and finally its own military campaigns against anti-establishment guerrilla 
fighters and the communist Viet Cong. This will turn into arguably the most devastating 
foreign policy and military mistakes in U.S. history. 
 The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 brought back the maximalist agenda by 
re-embracing NSC-68 and giving full financial and political support to our allies across 
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the globe. It wasn’t until the near catastrophe of October of 1962 when the Soviets moved 
missiles in Cuba, that United States foreign policy perception became existentially 
threatening. The reinitiating of nuclear threats caused the United States, led by President 
Kennedy at this time, to reenter with full force of negotiations and militaristic 
intimidations of deterrence. The maximalist method worked and the crisis ended without 
nuclear war, but it once again reminded the West of the high stakes Russia was trying to 
bring to the conflict and the need of active participation. The Cuban Missile Crisis ended 
one part of the Cold War and opened the second part for the administrative war hawks to 
administer more power in future violent conflicts with communism, particularly in the 
country of Vietnam. “Two events—Vietnam and Watergate— have cast a long shadow of 
our understanding of how American foreign policy unfolded in the 1970s.” (Sestanovich 
192) Nixon’s Watergate scandal landed the executive branch in a period of tumult and 
distrust, after having declared a resurgence of Retrenchment Strategy through the Nixon 
Doctrine in trying to withdraw the United States from Vietnam. The violent ending to the 
war came with a general animosity towards the United States from developing nations 
after the demolition of Vietnam. 
 From the end of the Nixon administration through the Reagan years, the United 
States foreign policy underwent a transformative process from détente strategy to a plan 
to end the Cold War. Each presidency and administration adds another step in the 
direction of this goal to leave this war in history from 1973 to 1989, as Reagan put it, to 
make the foreign policy agenda about resolving the conflict instead of drawing out the 
pain or prolonging the expensive game of attrition. Throughout this era of political 
conservatism and uncertainty about the economic future, new tools of both war and 
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diplomacy were implemented by the executive and legislative branches to have effective 
changes in the Department of State and Department of Defense in the United States be 
more influential in its areas of conflict, mainly at the end of the Vietnam War, in Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East and Central America. 
 After Nixon’s resignation, Gerald Ford inherited much of his cabinet and his 
foreign policy strategies, most influential to the relationship America had with the Third 
World was his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. The secretary’s statecraft tactics 
throughout Nixon, Ford and Carter’s presidencies were oriented with stabilizing our 
economic dependence on OPEC during the political tremors of the 1970s and to help 
align Third World nations with the United States as opposed to the U.S.S.R. by resolving 
regional conflict with diplomatic mediation. This primarily happened in the resolution of 
the Yom Kippur War in 1973 that settled peace for Israel and the surrounding Arab 
states, succeeded in negotiating "disengagement agreements" which put in place narrow 
demilitarized zones between the opposing forces in the Golan Heights, and next to the 
Suez Canal and began the Camp David Accords carried on by Jimmy Carter during his 
presidency. This was considered a diplomatic success until the deals were annulled by the 
assassination of President Sadat. During the late 1970s, the support plans for allies and 
interests of the United States were executed in geographic and cultural categories in a 
progressive policy strategy called “Regionalism” and was how the Arc of Crisis in 1979 
was dealt with by the State Department and executive offices of President Carter. The 
Arc of Crisis threw off much of what he wanted to promote in global human rights by 
determining U.S. foreign aid grants and the government’s respect and protection of their 
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citizens’ rights. Carter’s goals in aiming for diplomatic solutions created domestic Cold 
War-weariness and economic uncertainty that elected Ronald Reagan in 1980. 
 Iran continues to be an enormous foreign policy issue after its deposition of the 
U.S.-supported Shah regime in 1979 and installation of the new Islamic Republic under 
an ayatollah, or supreme religious leader. This new regional destabilizer was opposed by 
the Ba’athist Party military leader in Iraq, Saddam Hussain, who invaded Iran in 
September of 1980 with the support of America in hopes of countering Iran’s 
revolutionary power surge and dangerous autonomy. The war became tricky when in 
1985 the United States also began selling military weapons to Iran to fund the Contras, a 
Nicaraguan political military group, in the debacle referred to as the Iran-Contra Scandal, 
which lasted until 1987 after Congress refused to militarily intervene in Nicaragua, which 
is what Reagan suggested, saying that “the Contras are ‘moral equivalents to our 
Founding Fathers’ and that ‘we owe them our help’” (Ambrose 327). This went on while 
the United States simultaneously supported “Operation Staunch” which in 1983, resolved 
that arms deals can only be made amongst its allies with Iraq and not Iran in this conflict 
during the terrible years of this war. Both of the Iran-Contra Scandal and Operation 
Staunch were morally corrupt policies that the United States carried out under Reagan’s 
maximalist agenda. The insurgent wars and foreign affairs tactical decisions are 
retrospectively difficult to justify, and supported by shady methods from World War II 
and Vietnam-era foreign policy. 
 In the late 1970s, “in his relations with the Soviet Union, Carter’s major goals were 
to free America from its ‘inordinate fear of Communism’ and to complete a SALT II 
treaty that would reduce the chances of nuclear war.” (Ambrose 283) Reagan disagreed 
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with this apparently weaker stance against Russia, and when he won adopted a cavalier 
doctrine in his “Full Court Press”, as Sestanovich calls it, he would regain America’s 
strong independent voice. It wasn’t until his second presidential term that he exercised 
peace-oriented negotiations and began working closely with Gorbachev to make peace 
between the two nations. As Ambrose states about this time, “As a second-term president, 
with his last election behind him, Reagan stopped calling the Soviet Union an “evil 
empire” and started indicating that he might be willing to sit down with the new Soviet 
leader, Gorbachev.” (Ambrose 332) Gorbachev coming to power in 1985 was, in 
retrospect, what made the difference in Soviet-American peaceful negotiations in heading 
towards the end of the U.S.S.R. 
 After the end of Reagan’s time in office, internal U.S.S.R. conflicts were seeming 
to overflow and become too much for the Central Government to control. George H.W. 
Bush’s administration oversaw the world’s transition from a bipolar Cold War system to 
a unipolar system with the United States at the wheel and the Soviets without unified 
support. As Sestanovich puts it, he was weary to accept the Cold War was officially 
ending, proceeding with caution in relations with Moscow, and focusing on German 
reunification. This allowed for more negotiations on START I with Russia, that paved the 
way for further improvements during the Clinton Administration after the 1992 elections. 
The Clinton-Yeltsin relationship subdued international tensions and institutionalized 
nuclear weapons checks to make START treaties more effective. Bill Clinton aimed to 
balance the federal budget, cut military costs, and expand NATO while making the 
organization act to quail the Serbs attempt at mass ethnic genocide and play a primarily 
diplomatic role in the conflict’s resolution through the Dayton Accords. The historical 
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account had more positive reactions in comparison to the Gulf War and the sequential 
Iraq and Afghan invasions enacted by the George W. Bush administration after the terror 
attacks of 9/11. Since then, the tumult of these wars has perpetuated weariness within our 
allies that aren’t expressing the same confidence they had toward past administrations. 
The post-9/11 Bush Doctrine, embracing unparalleled military strength for regime change 
instead of diplomacy, made American Exceptionalism resurge and continue at high levels 
to this present administration. The Obama Doctrine encouraged a “scaled-back energetic 
interventionism” (Cole Lecture, 12/1) that was implemented through automated warfare 
in the Arab Spring’s wake, especially with drone strikes in Afghanistan, Yemen, and the 
new ISIS territories in Iraq and Syria that are continuously problematic for regional 
stability. 
 In conclusion, I agree that it’s fair to say that retrenchment and maximalism both 
worked at different times in foreign policy history, but were used appropriately and 
intermittently, never holding to just one methodology. The Trump administration 
represents a marked departure from what has come before in American international 
relations. As exemplified by Dr. Ikenberry, “every U.S. president from Woodrow Wilson 
to Barack Obama has maintained that an enduring community of liberal democracies 
exists, and that democracies possess a unique capacity to cooperate… Trump disdains 
this vision of the order, refusing to distinguish between liberal democratic friends and 
autocratic rivals.” (Ikenberry, 8) Allies like Chancellor Merkel are proclaiming the U.S. 
to be “unreliable for Europe” and its allies, after meeting the newly inaugurated 
president. Other authors like Stewart Patrick claim that Trump in also abandoning the 
U.S. global leadership position it’s held for the last 13 presidents, since Roosevelt, at a 
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time when the world needs a superpower advocating for free markets, internationally 
unifying treaties and combatants against climate change. His presidency follows an era of 
increasing American power that “between 1993 and 2014 the United States had more 
power than ever before but, in its foreign policy, experienced less success than ever 
before (Mandelbaum 368). Trump is an extreme internal reaction to Americans’ war-
wariness, frustration with unwilling allies, and general distrust in the political and 
economic systems. As President Trump continues to isolate the U.S. further from the 
international community, the world will have to bear the consequences of our own past 
policy mistakes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
CASE STUDY: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND MISPERCEPTION 
 
 
 
 China and the United States have had one of the most variable relationships in 
history. The two nations have allied in battle, pitted against each other in proxy conflicts, 
and ultimately engaged in enormous economic interests that’ve kept them forcibly close. 
Keeping the countries apart is the inconsistency of trust and perception they have of one 
another. Instability in their relationship comes from the fundamental disagreements on 
governance, trade issues, geopolitical proxy conflicts, human rights, and conflicting 
views on spheres of political influence. Although diplomatic, economic, and even 
sporting strategies have been used to try and solve these problems, they have yielded only 
temporary headway and haven’t succeeded in creating a lasting friendship.  
 To build a relationship based on trust and mutual understanding, it’s crucial for 
these two countries to combat the forms of misperception in their negotiations. Finding 
out the history of their distrust is an essential start. Beginning with birth of the 
Communist Party of China in 1929 to the present, I’ll briefly discuss the periods of ill-
communication and friendship between China and the United States. Bringing the trend 
of misperception up to the present, the main body of my research looks at the cause-and-
effect relationship that the two countries have in their international policy towards each 
other and that there is more evidence of trust between them that we can expect to see 
expand in the future. By following the progress of President Trump in how he navigates 
his way through different types of diplomacy to work with President Xi Jinping, we 
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discover the current faults that this Message-Influence Model yields (Corman et al, 
2008).  
 According to a Council of Foreign Relations report, in 2010 China surpassed 
Japan as the world’s second-largest economy after annual economic growth being 
between 7 and 15% since 1992 and is further predicted to overtake the United States as 
the number one economic power by 2027 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). 
China has been a permanent member on the Security Council of the United Nations since 
its inception in 1945 with other emerging victors from World War II, and they’ve been a 
rising military power with the world’s largest standing army in history (Gertz, The 
National Interest, 2016). These achievements mark China’s determination to become the 
new superpower in the world. With great strides like these, the status quo power that 
China has come into competition with is the United States.  
 This won’t be the first time that they have faced off. Many accredited political 
theorists believe that the two countries will continue conflicting with one another, or in 
the most severe predictions, lead into war. Most notably, Graham Allison’s 
aforementioned predictions that the two countries could fall into the Thucydides’ Trap is 
among the most accredited (Allison, 2017). It’s important to outline the exact threatening 
symptoms that have been exhibited in recent history that have shown incapability of 
productive negotiations and avoiding conflict that could lead to violence 
 The two countries have been adversaries through many international conflicts 
since the founding of the prevailing communist regime. The Korean War, Vietnam War, 
and the Taiwanese Strait Crises have all put China and the United States at odds. 
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 During the Korean War, the United States and its allies in the United Nations, 
Australia, Britain and France came to the aid of South Korea when the Soviet-backed 
North Koreans invaded in 1950 (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, CFR, 2018). When 
the South Korean alliance troops approached the Sino-Korean border, the Chinese aid to 
North Korea went from financial and resource assistance to complete military 
intervention. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) beat back the South Korean 
alliance troops and helped the North maintain military control over their borders until the 
ceasefire was signed in 1953. Since the ceasefire, China has kept its precarious 
relationship with the North Korean totalitarian regime by continuing to be its number one 
trade partner. As of 2016, China is responsible for 85% of North Korea’s exports and 
90% of the goods that North Korea imports (World Fact Book, CIA, 2016), despite the 
pressure from the international community to inforce non-exemptible global sanctions to 
curb the country’s nuclear program. 
 The crises of the Taiwan Strait were undoubtedly the tensest times in Sino-
American relations due to two misperceptions: the unpredictability of the Communist 
state for the United States and American unwillingness to recognize the communist state 
as legitimate over the nationalist party in Taiwan (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, 
CFR, 2018). After supporting both the nationalist party and the communist party forces 
throughout World War II in combatting Japanese imperialist forces in China, the 
American government continued supporting only Chiang Kai Shek and his nationalist 
party (KMT) after the war had ended in 1945 (Tucker, 2009). Immediately following the 
end of World War II, the Chinese Civil War between the communists and the nationalists 
went into full thrust. Once it was clear that the communist party had gained the majority 
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of the population’s support7, the war turned in favor of the communists, forcing the 
nationalist leaders and their ardent supporters to flee the country to the neighboring island 
of Taiwan. Since the nationalist party’s establishment of the Republic of China, 
independent from the mainland People’s Republic of China (PRC) which established 
itself officially in 1949, the two Chinas have been seeking recognition as the true China 
by the rest of the world. After the end of the civil war, the United States and other 
western powers continued supporting Taiwan as the officially recognized China. This 
caused issues of political existentialism and territoriality between the two Chinas that to a 
lesser degree still exist to this day (Albert, CFR, 2016). When President Eisenhower 
lifted the blockade on Taiwan in August of 1953, Chaing Kai Shek gave permission for 
thousands of troops to move into the Quemoy and Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait 
which were prior occupied by the communist regime. The PLA began shelling the islands 
mercilessly from the mainland until the United States stepped in to threaten the PRC with 
nuclear retaliation unless it ceased its attacks (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, CFR, 
2018). The United States signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan and the threats were 
observed by the PLA. This temporarily resolved the conflict from becoming an armed 
conflict, but crises similar to this involving the Taiwan Strait reoccurred in 1956 and even 
as recently as 1996 (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, CFR, 2018).  
 During the Vietnam War, the Viet Kong sent an envoy to China to ask for aid 
against the advancing American military threat in South Vietnam (Jian, 1995). In the 
                                                 
7 Chaing Kai Shek, the Chinese nationalist party leader, was losing support fast in the countryside first, 
holding on to population centers like Nanjing and Guangzhou until the final months of the war, but it’s 
important to note that Chaing lost much of the popular support because of his close ties with America and 
other Western powers that once forcibly colonized and manipulated much of China for its wealth in the 18th 
and 19th centuries (Kenley, 2012). This is the bedrock of Chinese distrust of American influence and 
Western political agenda. 
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early 1960s when this deal was being made, Mao Zedong armed Vietnamese battalions to 
prevent the American advancement on North Vietnam to protect their border region and 
provide a buffer from American influence, fearing another close-to-home combat war 
like what happened on the Korean Peninsula (Ross, 2001). This was an uncharacteristic 
move by China, who had traditionally been an adversary of Vietnam at best for centuries, 
but who distrusted American intentions more than the old enemies of China. 
In addition to past close calls, two recent events sparked potential major conflicts 
in bilateral relations: 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 
American spy plane incident. These flash points in international relations tested the 
tensions these two counties could face while still maintaining peaceful relations. 
 In her book Powerful Patriots: National Protest in China’s Foreign Relations, 
Weiss discusses two incidents between China and the United States in great depth. The 
1999 Chinese Embassy bombing in Yugoslavia and the 2001 EP-3 plane collision created 
great riffs in Sino-American relations but they were handled very differently domestically 
in China for many reasons. The embassy bombing incident was extremely harmful to 
China’s dignity and viewed as a much more serious catastrophe than the collision. Three 
journalists died and 20 Chinese citizens were injured in the bombing and it inspired the 
people of China to file immediately for protesting rights in front of the U.S. embassy in 
Beijing. They were granting students and workers the rights to protest there for the first 
time since the last ones were brutally put down at Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Weiss, 
2014).  
 This new ability for select citizens to demonstrate against the United States was 
potentially destabilizing for Chinese control. But at the same time, this was a powerful 
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demonstration for Chinese international image of projecting the raw political and people 
power that the government controls within its borders. It’s an intimidating visualization 
for America to see so many Chinese voicing against U.S. actions. These factors brought 
them back into the spotlight to apologize, but it was insufficient in the minds of Chinese 
leaders and citizens, but not insincere enough to further escalate the conflict. 
 The EP-3 incident when an American spy plane apparently swerved into a 
Chinese fighter within Chinese air space without permission, collided with the fighter, 
and sent it down into the South China Sea while the spy plane requested an emergency 
landing on Hainan Island in South China. This didn’t lead to uprisings to the magnitude 
of the embassy bombing, but the Chinese government chose to discourage anti-American 
protests. This time, because of the new “war hawk regime” of George Bush and the 
threats of repeated protest exposure of Chinese citizens to these dangerous freedoms of 
assembly and speech that hang in delicate balance within Chinese governance (Weiss, 
2014). 
 With the importance of the Sino-American relationship growing politically every 
year to use their powers to solve regional and world issues together, the need for renewed 
and reinvigorated amicable relations between the two countries’ leadership to show that 
there’s great chance for prosperity in the future. To prove the need for this, my research 
maps the interactions between the Trump administration and the Xi administration in the 
past year and a half of their overlapped time in office.  
 
Sino-American Relations Research: Perception Vs. Reality 
 In the previous chapters, theory and history have pointed to misperception in 
world politics being a deadly symptom of impending conflict. When leadership is elected 
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or chosen to represent the country, they are tasked with making clear goals and upholding 
peace with other nations to the best of their ability. As Morganthau stated, human nature 
doesn’t want us to go to war, but when the survival of the state and national identity is 
threatened, any state will do what it must to survive (Morganthau, 1978). By popular 
predictions from Allison, this could mean war for China and the United States (Allison, 
2017). 
 The research purpose was to find areas of improvement for United States foreign 
policy that could prompt useful change in its communication methodology. Through the 
background research laid out in previous chapters of this thesis, I hypothesize that the 
basis of disagreement between China and the United States is misperception of each 
other’s goals and an unwillingness to initiate understanding of the other’s perspective to 
form consensus agreements. Diplomacy is a tool which allows both sides to voice their 
concerns over an issue, and after the viewpoints have been expressed that concessions 
would be made by both sides in order to find an agreeable solution. When two countries 
believe that their goals are too different and conflict too deeply, Clausewitz’s famous 
prophecy is doomed to be realized8.  
 Using the Office of the Press Secretary’s press releases, direct interpretation of 
Trump’s diplomatic intentions from his advisors is published. These publications about 
the president’s close relational encounters with President Xi Jinping of China are crucial 
to developing what misperceptions are being conveyed between high level political 
interactions. The Chinese Communist Party reactions are published through state 
                                                 
8 This refers to the famous Prussian general, Carl Von Clausewitz, when he said that “war is the 
continuation of politics by other means”. This has been a keystone in realist international relations theory 
since On War was first published (Clausewitz, 1908). 
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sponsored media coverage of national and global events. The China Daily, an 
internationally printed state-approved media conglomerate, is the publication I’ve used in 
my research to determine reactions the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China has to American political actions9. The goal is to determine what events and news 
was being portrayed differently in each country having to do with their bilateral relations.  
 Measuring the reactions of each country’s leadership toward the other is a difficult 
task to take on. While reading press releases from each country, I noted each point of 
perception10 by the author of the press release and categorized each point of perception as 
a “New Agreement”, “Revisited Agreement”, “Revisited Disagreement”, or a “New 
Disagreement”. A “New Agreement” is deemed a positive interaction between the 
countries by the press release, fostering closer relations on a newly visited subject or 
bilateral agreement. A “Revisited Agreement” is also positive and deemed by the press 
release as a reaffirmation of a previous agreement.  A “Revisited Disagreement” is a 
negative interaction between the two counties that yields setbacks from friendly relations, 
but that has already been established as a disagreement previously and hasn’t been 
solved. Finally, a “New Disagreement” is a negative interaction that has not been 
addressed before by China and the United States, which could create more problems for 
relations in the future.  
 To quantify the qualitative data of how well an interaction went between 
Presidents Trump and Xi by the Office of the Press Secretary, I assigned a points system 
                                                 
9 I’ve chosen this news agency to represent the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
because they’re owned and operated by the Communist Party of China and the State Council Information 
Office and was established June 1st, 1981 by the organization to publish state news worldwide in English. 
10 I define “points of perception” as the author’s written take on an event in relation to its effects on 
bilateral relations between the United States and China.  
 52 
to the agreement options. “New Agreements” are two points, “Revisited Agreements” are 
one point, “Revisited Disagreements” are negative one point, and “New Disagreements” 
are negative two points. The newly visited subjects in press releases are worth two points 
(positive or negative) because of the relevance to the current diplomatic climate and add 
much more significance to an interaction between heads of state and their future 
interactions. Communications that were documented in press releases from the Press 
Secretary Office between the United States and China included State Visits, phone calls, 
joint-press statements, trade agreements and memorandums, but were all scored the same 
way based on the negotiations that transpired. 
The language analysis in the press releases was done by referencing a phrase list 
to understand how the author’s perception was taken. These analyses distinguish the 
points of perception whether they fall in the contributing to the “New Agreements” which 
are two points, “Revisited Agreements” which are one point, “Revisited Disagreements” 
which are negative one point, and “New Disagreements” which are negative two points. I 
compiled this phrase list from commonly used preambulary and operative words of the 
United Nations to describe a position the author is taking in official documents. The 
statements with positive and negative associations are modeled after the word list. 
Leading statements are phrases from the United Nations word list that signal that a point 
of perception is being formed in the sentence, but that it isn’t clear by only the phrase if 
the perception of the subject is going to be positive or negative. Using the leading 
statements, these are the phrases that indicate that with further context given in the 
information provided on the subject in the press release that there will be a disclosed 
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point of perception that can be accounted for in the data. The key word list can be found 
in Appendix D.  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1 – Chinese Perception towards the United States 
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FIGURE 4.2 - United States Perception towards China 
 
 
Results 
 On April 7th, 2017 at the beginning of President Trump and President Xi’s 
relationship, they agreed on an annual schedule called the United States-China 
Comprehensive Dialogue and has been a huge source of stability for bilateral relations. 
The two presidents oversee that the dialogue is carried out and that it has four pillars: the 
Diplomatic and Security Dialogue; the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue; the Law 
Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue; and the Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue 
(Press Secretary Spicer, 2017). For this reason, there were plenty of opportunities to 
gather sufficient data to make accurate tables11 and graphs12 to display the diplomatic 
events the two nations have experienced in relation to each other.  
                                                 
11 Tables used for data plotting and graphing Total Points of Perception located in Appendix A 
12 Copies of graphs and results of the Total Points of Perception located in Appendix B 
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 There are several issues that have scary potential to escalate if not swayed away 
from a deadly conflict that some leading academics warn about. The majority of issues 
surrounding potential fields of conflict and misperception are regional geopolitical issues, 
(Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula), human rights (Tibetan sovereignty, religious 
freedom, minority rights), trade relations, territorial and military expansions (South China 
Sea, International Law of the Sea abuse and the Diaoyudao/Senkaku Islands dispute). 
These issues were the majority of what was published on in the press releases and what 
caused such high-level debate.  
 American views of China were negative in times where there was very little direct 
contact between the two presidents. It was when they were apart for several months at a 
time, for example when the prospects over a trade war Trump was threatening beginning 
in January where after not being in the company of the Chinese president since the state 
visit in November the year before. Good relations were unfolding between the two 
nations after the state visit when the two presidents met with each other’s business 
leaders while in Beijing and made strides on economic cooperation. This was seemingly a 
move by Xi to destress the impending political situation with the memorandum Trump 
filed with the U.S. Commerce Department to investigate Chinese intellectual property 
theft and manipulation within China. 
The U.S. first announced the tariffs on March 1st after a U.S. Commerce Department 
investigation under Section 232 of U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to the dismay of 
Chinese businesses, showing a failure in Chinese diplomacy to reconcile with the 
American government. 
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 The perceptions of China towards the United States dipped in moments of harsh 
criticism that the China Daily categorized as “hypocritical and unfair” (China Daily, 
April 21st, 2018). When the United States issued its annual human rights reports about 
each country the previous year, China was outraged to be called a “source of instability 
for the world” and was very vocal about denying this (China Daily, April 21st, 2018). In 
most recent months since the beginning of 2018, China has been attempting to combat 
America’s advances on the trade war Trump has progressed with targeting Chinese 
companies by imposing duties of 25 percent on steel and 10 percent on aluminum to 
counter cheap imports, especially from China (Reuters, 2018). These decisions were not 
made by international negotiation, phone calls with China, or visits with President Xi.  
 
Conclusion 
 Friendly relations between nations and heads of state are developed, or catalyzed, 
by the direct contact between leaders. At the points of most contact between the 
presidents were when most trade relations, regional geopolitical issues and bilateral 
political relations improved most. The prospects Presidents Xi and Trump outlined for 
further relations on April 7th, 2017 was an excellent model for all nations, because it 
targeted the issues the two nations could profit most from discussing. This is either 
because they fervently disagreed with each other on them or they both had high stakes in 
continuing to strengthen their countries in this dialogue category.  
 My original hypothesis wasn’t disproven, because misperception continues to be a 
key variable in why the two countries don’t understand the other’s actions on a certain 
issue. This could be because of the communication shortfalls between the nations’ leaders 
during times of high political stress. The misperception could come from the personal 
 57 
differences between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump that could have a huge influence on 
the foreign policies they adopt for their countries toward each other. As was discussed in 
Chapter II, Kenneth Waltz’s First Image accounts for the power human nature has in 
determining whether war occurs by the authority of a single leader with a high ranking of 
power (Waltz, 1959). Trump’s “America First” Doctrine, as discussed in Chapter III, has 
a lot to deal with the trade war prospects and his foreign policy unilateralism, while 
President Xi has also recently been granted the possibility of unlimited terms in office if 
he wishes (BBC World News, 2018) as well as nearly complete centralization of power 
through his designation as President of the PRC and Chair of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China.  
 In reference to my original thesis, I stand by what I’ve said: The United States has 
a communication problem. There is a record the country holds of using its preordained 
hegemonic capabilities to determine the fates of other countries, whether they comply 
with the American world image or not. The Message-Influence Model that we’ve grown 
accustomed to, where the President of the United States can decide to force China’s 
economic hand by unilaterally slapping on tariffs to their exports by executive order, is 
not harmonizing well with other countries. The frightening part is that the other countries 
are catching on to this model, and they’re moving on without the United States (Frum, 
2017; Simon, 2018). 
 The hope exists in regulating negotiations. Interpersonal Communication Theory 
has given social scientists new hopes in what conflict resolution could become for 
interstate relations, and it’s already being exercised in truth and reconciliation 
commissions across the globe. Conflicts dealing with a government wrongdoing or non-
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state actor causing harm to a community is just a couple of the functions, but they’ve 
proven to bridge gaps between communities and peoples that would have otherwise 
seemed impossible13. There were Truth and Reconciliation Commissions established in 
Ireland after the Good Friday Agreements became internationally recognized to heal the 
communities affected by the conflict after former Maine senator and special diplomatic 
envoy George Mitchell helped bring Great Britain and Ireland to peace talks moderate 
their negotiation (Connolly, 2006).  
 These diplomatic victories don’t have to be uncommon. Most truth and 
reconciliation commissions follow the basic interpersonal relations formula designed by 
Trenholm and Jensen explained in Chapter II. The United States has an obligation to 
choose the best methods of negotiation to benefit Americans as we do our allies, potential 
friends in the international community, and to avoid war at all costs. To reinvigorate our 
‘Soft Power’, American leadership must regulate its diplomatic practice and lead by 
example. Promote uncovering the truth, reconciling with our adversaries, and battling the 
dangerous clouds of misperception to propagate peace. 
Future Work Suggestions 
Finding the Chinese perception of the United States for future work is important. 
This research project was designed to analyze U.S. foreign policy strategies and the need 
to account for other countries’ perception of our nation. 
 
                                                 
13 Truth and reconciliation commissions have been working in South Africa beginning in 1994 to heal 
communities after the abolition of apartheid (South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)), 
as a part of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement in 2012 to bring native 
populations into communities where they were relocated, to name two examples 
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Comparing the communication strategies American executive administrations 
have with different heads of state from China. This could reveal different methods not 
thought of with China specifically, which could prove that this case study of the Trump 
administration with the Xi administration is just an anomaly in American foreign policy 
with China and its effects. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Press Releases (Dates) New 
Agreements 
Revisited 
Agreements 
Revisited 
Disagree-
ments 
New 
Disagree-
ments 
Notes Total points of 
Negotiation 
and 
Understanding 
Month, Year Total Points of 
Perception (U.S. 
towards China) 
President’s Call with 
President Xi 
(February 9, 2017) 
1 2 0 0 
 
4 2/17 4 
Statement from the Press 
Secretary on the United 
States-China Visit 
(April 7th, 2017) 
0 6 3 1 confrontation 
on trade, IP, 
maritime 
activity 
1 4/17 1 
President Trump After 
Meeting with President Xi 
(April 7, 2017) 
0 3 0 0 
 
3 7/4/2017 3 
President Trump’s Call 
with President Xi 
(April 12, 2017) 
0 1 0 0 
 
1 12/4/2017 1 
President Trump’s Phone 
Call with President Xi 
Jinping 
(July 2, 2017) 
0 2 0 0 
 
2 2/7/2017 2 
President Trump Before 
Bilateral Meeting with 
President Xi 
(July 8, 2017) 
0 2 0 0 
 
2 8/7/2017 2 
President Trump’s 
Meeting with President Xi 
Jinping 
(July 8, 2017) 
0 2 0 0 
 
2 8/7/2017 2 
President Trump Takes 
Action on Intellectual 
Property Rights 
(August, 14, 2017) 
0 0 1 1 Chinese IP 
theft 
-3 14/8/2017 -3 
President Trump’s Call 
with President Xi Jinping 
(September 18, 2017) 
1 0 0 0 
 
2 18/9/2017 2 
President Trump’s Call 
with President Xi Jinping  
(October 25, 2017) 
0 2 0 0 
 
2 oct. 17 2 
President Trump and 
President Xi Before 
Expanded Bilateral 
Meeting 
(November 9, 2017) 
0 4 1 0 
 
3 nov. 17 3 
State Visit to China 
(November 10, 2017) 
4 16 4 0 
 
20 nov. 17 20 
President Trump’s Call 
with President Xi Jinping 
(January 16, 2018) 
0 1 1 1 trade war 
prospects 
-2 16/1/2018 -2 
President Trump’s Call 
with President Xi Jinping 
(March 9, 2018) 
0 2 0 0 
 
2 9/3/2018 2 
Presidential 
Memorandum on the 
Actions by the United 
States Related to the 
Section 301 Investigation 
(March 22, 2018) 
0 0 1 4 four new 
actions 
against 
Chinese IP 
theft 
-9 22/3/2018 -9 
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Press Releases 
(Dates) 
New 
Agreements 
Revisited 
Agreements 
Revisited 
Disagreements 
New 
Disagreements 
Notes Month, Year Total Points of 
Perception (China 
towards U.S.) 
China refutes 
US criticism on 
human rights 
(April 23, 2018) 
0 0 1 0 negative press on 
human rights 
report from US 
‘force of 
instability’ 
23/4/2018 -1 
Trump may 
send envoy to 
talk trade 
(April 22, 2018)  
0 0 0 0 potential 
negotiations, IMF 
warnings 
22/4/2018 0 
Beijing says 
hegemony 
behind US 
actions 
(April 21, 2018) 
0 0 1 0 retorts 21/4/2018 -1 
China refutes 
US research 
report on Belt 
and Road 
Initiative 
(April 18, 2018) 
0 0 1 0 belt and road 
report ‘to expand 
econ and mil 
presence’ 
18/4/2018 -1 
Trump orders 
strikes against 
Syria 
(April 14, 2018) 
0 0 2 0 Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Hua 
Chunying said 
China has urged 
dialogue 
14/4/2018 -2 
China says it 
remains willing 
to discuss US 
trade issues 
(March 27, 
2018) 
0 1 1 0 
 
27/3/2018 0 
Beijing asks 
WTO members 
to unite 
(March 23, 
2018) 
0 0 1 0 China called for 
World Trade 
Organization 
members to 
oppose the US 
Section 301 trade 
sanction 
investigations 
23/3/2018 -1 
China warns US 
against putting 
bilateral trade 
ties in jeopardy 
(March 23, 
2018) 
0 0 3 2 US industries, 
china, world, all 
disagree with 
trumps actions 
23/3/2018 -7 
Xi and Trump 
discuss possible 
Kim meeting 
(March 12, 
2018) 
1 3 0 0 bilateral relations 
are good and 
important, NK 
prospects are good 
12/3/2018 5 
Xi, Trump 
confer over Kim 
meeting 
(March 10, 
2018)  
1 1 0 0 xi and trump 
reaffirm NK talks 
10/3/2018 3 
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China urges 
reversal of steep 
new US tariffs 
(March 10, 
2018) 
0 0 1 3 The US first 
announced the 
tariffs on March 1 
after a US 
Commerce 
Department 
investigation under 
Section 232 of US 
Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 
10/3/2018 -7 
Yang, Tillerson 
pledge to 
address trade 
issues 
(February 9, 
2018) 
1 3 0 0 top dips hang in 
dc, pledge 
continued talks 
and  
9/2/2018 5 
Xi, Trump 
discuss Korean 
Peninsula 
(January 17, 
2018) 
1 2 0 0 "making the cake 
of cooperation 
bigger", Xi said 
17/1/2018 4 
Xi-Trump 
meeting: New 
consensus 
achieved  
(November 9, 
2017) 
0 4 0 0 met with ea. 
other’s business 
partners, econ 
cooperation, 
consensus 
9/11/2017 4 
Unilateral probe 
of China's trade 
could hurt both 
Washington, 
Beijing 
(August 19, 
2017) 
0 0 3 0 China supports 2.6 
million american 
jobs 
19/8/2017 -3 
China expresses 
'grave concerns' 
about new US 
memorandum 
(August 15, 
2017) 
2 0 0 0 respect 
international 
bilateral trade 
rules 
15/8/2017 4 
Wang, US 
counterpart hail 
interaction of 
two countries 
(August 7, 2017) 
0 2 0 0 ASEAN, Wang + 
Tillerson agreed 
on continuing 
dialogue and plan 
next 50 years 
7/8/2017 2 
China, US to 
join forces on 
economy 
(July 10, 2017) 
1 3 1 0 100-day economic 
cooperation action 
plan, US maritime 
intrusion, NK 
10/8/2017 4 
Xi's visit to US 
called 
constructive 
(April 10, 2017) 
2 2 0 0 smooth transition 
of China-US ties 
10/4/2017 6 
Xi, Trump to 
'map out' Sino-
US ties 
(April 1, 2017) 
0 2 0 0 optimistic 1/4/2017 2 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
United Nations Word Bank 
 
POSITIVE NEGATIVE LEADING STATEMENTS 
Affirming Alarmed Bearing in mind 
Commends Concerned Believing 
Appreciation Deploring Contemplating 
Gratitude Disturbed Convinced 
Satisfaction Disagrees Declaring 
Reaffirming Condemns Deeply concerned 
Thanking  Denounces Deeply conscious 
Agrees  Discourages Deeply convinced 
Approves  Rejects Desiring 
Endorses Regretting Emphasizing 
Supports 
 
Expecting 
Welcoming 
 
Fulfilling 
Trusts 
 
Fully aware 
  
Keeping in mind 
  
Observing 
  
Recalling 
  
Referring 
  
Taking into consideration 
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